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1. INTRODUCTION
The common law principle that directors owe a primary duty to their corpo-
ration and a secondary duty to the shareholders of that corporation has been
gradually eroded by the federal securities laws so that directors are charged with
owing duties to shareholders, with the corporation and other corporate constit-
uents relegated to a lower status.' Further, the shareholder primacy model has
become the dominant model in scholarship theories with regard to the firm,
although other models have been proposed and debated. 2 Under the shareholder
primacy model, shareholders are considered the "owners" of the corporation and
therefore given rights at the expense of other corporation constituents. 3 In reality,
shareholders have a property interest in their shares, not in the corporation's
assets. Further, they have no access to the corporation's assets and no right to
direct or control the disposition of those assets.4 The notion that shareholders are
* Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor of Law and Chair of the Steering Committee and a Co-
Director of the Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School. She is a
former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the research assistance of Brooklyn Law School students John Ivascu and Daniel Taytsel and the
comments of Richard M. Phillips and Professor Dana Brakman Reiser. An earlier version of this Article
was presented at the 2004 Sloan Conference for the Study of Business in Society at the George
Washington University Law School and the author benefited from comments at the conference. The
author also thanks Dean Joan Wexler for a research stipend from Brooklyn Law School, which was of
assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 17-34.
2. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97
Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 563 (2003).
3. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Sept. 13, 1970, at 32-33, 122-26, available at http://www.reputationinstitute.com/sections/rank/
friedman.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004), American Federation of Labor & Congress of industrial
Organizations, Letter of Comment on SEC proposal S7-19-03, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules
proposed/s71903/aflcio121903.htm (Dec. 19, 2003) [hereinafter AFI/CIO Comment Letter].
4. Shareholders generally cannot control dividend policy or share repurchases. See Klang v. Smith's
Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 157 (Del. 1997); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,
722 (Del. 1971); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W 668,682 (Mich. 1919). Neither can shareholders
control a liquidation of corporate assets. See Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85,
86 (1880). For some academic criticisms of the idea that shareholders are owners of the corporation,
see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOwA L. REv. 1, 4 (2002);
Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Argumentsfor Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1189, 1191-
95 (2002).
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"owners" sometimes expresses the notion that they are the residual claimants on
the corporation's assets. This concept also is flawed.
5
Modern institutional investors do not necessarily behave like owners of cor-
porate property Although some institutions supply patient capital to corporations
and hold shares for the long term, many institutions are short-term traders or
invest in the equity markets through passive index funds. 6 Nevertheless, the share-
holder primacy norm has been strengthened and reinforced by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. 7 In the wake of recent corporate scandals, institutions have
been demanding more rights, for example, more rights with respect to the nom-
ination of corporate directors. In view of these demands, this Article will inquire
as to whether large shareholders should obtain any such rights without also ac-
quiring duties to the corporations in which they invest, and to other shareholders.
Shareholders do not generally owe any duties to one another or the corpora-
tions in which they own shares. There are two exceptions to this proposition.
Controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders, although
the theoretical basis for this exception is not entirely clear.8 Some courts have
imposed fiduciary duties upon shareholders in close corporations akin to the
duties partners owe to one another.9 Can either of these theories be extended to
fit the role of institutional investors in a large public corporation, or is the role of
the institutional investor different? Institutional shareholders are not investing
their own capital, but the capital of others to whom they owe fiduciary duties.
There is a potential and sometimes an actual conflict between the beneficiaries of
an institutional investor and the shareholders and other constituents of corpora-
tions in which they invest. On the other hand, institutions have a duty to invest
assets of their beneficiaries prudently and such prudence may benefit the financial
structures and operations of portfolio companies.' 0
In the 1980s and 1990s, equity came to trump all other corporate constitu-
encies. Further, institutional investors became much more heavily invested in
5. Stout, supra note 4, at 1192-95.
6. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE: FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25-28 (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.conference-board.org/PDF-
free/756.pdf [hereinafter CONFERENCE BOARD COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONSI. This Commission was
composed of an impressive group of business leaders, institutional investors, and former government
officials, including Peter G. Peterson (chair), John W Snow, John H. Biggs, John C. Bogle, Charles A.
Bowsher, Arthur Levitt, Jr., and Paul A. Volker. See also Yuka Hayashi, Small-Cap Exchange-Traded
Funds Find Success, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2002, at B13D; Yuka Hayashi & Christine Bird, Institutional
Investors Take to the Sidelines, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2002, at C17; Insider; Insight: Business Managers
and the City; A Blot on the Cityscape, ACCOUNTANCY AGE, Jan. 22, 2004, at 18.
7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified tn scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
8. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947); Kahn v. Tremont Corp.,
694 A.2d 422,428-29 (Del.1997); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). My own
view is that the duty of controlling shareholders to minority shareholders is based on the ability of a
controlling shareholder to elect a majority of the board of directors, so that this duty is merely a
variant of the director's duty of loyalty, adjusted to reach the deep pocket of the controlling shareholder.
9. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975). Delaware
probably does not recognize such a duty See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380-81 (Del.
1993).
10. See Gregg v. Transp. Workers of Am. Int'l, 343 F3d 833, 840-41 (6th Cir. 2003).
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equity than had previously been customary.1' They therefore pressured corporate
executives to think like shareholders and be compensated in equity and, in ad-
dition, pressured corporations to report ever increasing earnings. These pressures
in the context of the "irrational exuberance"' 2 of a bull market led to financial
machinations at many public corporations. When the bull market collapsed, the
exposure of serious financial fraud at Enron and other companies led to the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Because the mandate of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) is investor protection, however, investors became the bene-
ficiaries of Sarbanes-Oxley rather than objects of further regulation. This Article
will argue that Sarbanes-Oxley will not prevent future Enrons as long as it is
administered pursuant to a shareholder primacy norm because investors as well
as corporate managers and directors need to be appropriately regulated.
The shareholder primacy norm replaced managerialism, but it has been chal-
lenged by state corporate constituency statutes and by some competing academic
theories, in particular, the nexus of contracts theory, the team production theory,
and the director primacy norm.' 3 Although each of these theories has merit, it is
unclear whether any of them would lay the foundation for curbing executive
abuses for the benefit of the corporation as a whole. If a duty to the business
enterprise in which institutions invest was imposed upon institutional sharehold-
ers, some of the pathologies which led to the 1990s stock market bubble might
be better addressed.
Investors are protected by the federal securities laws in order to encourage
capital formation and the efficient allocation of capital in the national economy
Unfortunately, institutional investors and their portfolio managers do not appear
to have done an adequate job of analyzing corporate earnings and balance sheets
in the 1990s despite the disclosures required by the federal securities laws. Al-
though the errant behavior of corporate managers and their advisors should not
be excused, institutional investors should also bear some of the blame for the
1990s stock market bubble and its inevitable collapse. Some of their questionable
investment practices can be corrected by focusing on the fiduciary duties they
owe to their own beneficiaries, but certain obligations to the corporations in which
they invest and the shareholders of those corporations could also be considered.
Part II of this Article will discuss the shareholder primacy norm and its con-
tribution to Enron and other scandals that emerged with the bursting of the stock
market bubble. The shareholder nomination controversy will be the subject of
Part Il. Part IV will discuss other constituency statutes, the team production
theory, and other competitors to the shareholder primacy norm. Part V will pro-
11. In part, this shift from more conservative investments such as bonds to equities has occurred
because of the acceptance of modem portfolio theory that encourages diversification, and the argument
that over time equities have a better return and are no more volatile than bonds. See Henry T. C. Hu,
Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REv. 777, 832-37 (2000).
12. This phrase was coined by Alan Greenspan. See Chairman Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the
Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Re-
search (Dec. 5, 1996), available at http://wwwfederalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.
htm.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 99-125.
4 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 60, November 2004
pose that obligations to the corporate enterprise, as well as rights, be imposed
upon institutional shareholders and that managers and directors be required to
consider the corporation as an enterprise as well as stockholders in making busi-
ness decisions.
II. EQUITY BECOMES KING
In the United Kingdom, courts generally recognize the principle that directors
owe fiduciary duties to their companies and not to individual shareholders.' 4 The
reason is that the fiduciary duties owed to a corporation arise from the legal
relationship between directors and their corporations, whereas any fiduciary du-
ties owed by directors to shareholders arise only in special circumstances where
directors are treated as having assumed a responsibility to act on behalf of, or for
the benefit of, shareholders.15 In such special relationships, and only in such
special situations, directors may owe individual shareholders duties of trust, con-
fidence, and loyalty'16 Otherwise, the duty of directors runs to the corporation as
a whole. 17 This doctrine was reaffirmed in the context of a contest for control in
Dawson International v. Coats Patton,' in which the court stated: "[iut was a basic
and well established principle of company law that the legal personalities of the
company and its shareholders were distinct. The fiduciary duty of directors was
owed to the company, although its exercise involved balancing disparate interests
including those of the company's employees and members." 19 The court therefore
declined to hold that fiduciary duties of directors run directly to the shareholders
in the context of the sale of an enterprise.
20
This English view was imported into the United States by way of state law. In
Goodwin v. Agassiz, 21 the Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to recognize the
legitimacy of a shareholder action for insider trading.22 The court rejected the
argument that directors occupy the position of trustee toward individual stock-
holders, citing to "an imposing weight of authority in other jurisdictions" and
pointing out that there was no legal privity between directors and stockholders.
2 3
This view was subject to an important exception, however, commonly known as
the "special facts" exception.2 4 Such cases usually involved situations where there
14. This rule was enunciated in Percival v. Wright, [19021 2 Ch. 421, 425-26 (1902) (holding that
directors do not hold a fiduciary position as trustees for individual shareholders). See also Great E. Ry.
Co. v. Turner, [1872-73] L.R. 8 Ch. 149, 152 (1871) (stating "[tihe directors are the mere trustees or
agents of the company-trustees of the company's money and property-agents in the transactions which
they enter into on behalf of the company").
15. Peskin v. Anderson 120011 B.C.C. 874 (C.A. 2000), available at No. A3/2000/0429/6326, 2000
WL 1841707 (Dec. 14, 2000).
16. Peskin, 2000 WL 1841707, at 6.
17. Id. at 5.
18. 1988 S.L.T. 854 (O.H. 1988).
19. Id. at 859.
20. Id. at 860-61.
21. 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).
22. Id. at 661-62. See also Smith v. Herd, 53 Mass. 371, 384 (1847).
23. Goodwin, 186 N.E. at 660.
24. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909).
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was face-to-face contact between a director and a shareholder, as opposed to
transactions over a public securities exchange, and where a director had peculiar
knowledge not available to a shareholder.25 This "special facts" exception also was
a part of English law.
26
The idea that directors do not owe fiduciary duties directly to shareholders was
challenged by the adoption of the federal securities laws in the 1930s. The Se-
curities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") 27 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act") 28 were based on a philosophy of full disclosure and were in-
tended to protect the public "with the least possible interference to honest busi-
ness." 29 The Securities Act imposed duties on corporations to make full disclosure
about their financial condition and affairs when raising capital from the public,
and made directors liable for false or misleading statements in prospectuses.
30
Listed companies were required to file annual and periodic reports3 and share-
holders of public companies were given rights to information and certain other
rights under the proxy rules prior to voting for directors. 32 Because the mandate
given to the SEC in the securities laws was investor protection, shareholders
became a protected class under federal law and in a variety of contexts the federal
courts gave shareholders direct rights against officers and directors.33 Further, in
amendments to the Exchange Act over the years, the SEC acquired the power to
discipline corporate officers and directors. 34
Nevertheless, the SEC role with respect to corporate governance was limited.
In cases involving both breaches of fiduciary duty and control contests, the Su-
25. Id. at 431-33.
26. See Allen v. Hyatt, 30 T.L.R. 444, 445 (1914). See also Peskin v. Anderson 120011 B.C.C. 874
(C.A. 2000), available at No. A3/2000/0429/6326, 2000 WL 1841707 (Dec. 14, 2000), at 5-6.
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (2000).
28. Id. §§ 78a-78mm.
29. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 E2d 1277, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing ROOSEVELT MESSAGE TO
CONGRESs RECOMMENDING PASSAGE OF SECURITIES ACT, H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 9-
10 (1933)).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
31. Initially, section 12 of the Exchange Act applied only to listed companies. In 1964, all public
companies with a sufficient number of shareholders and amount of assets became subject to Exchange
Act registration and required to file annual and periodic reports pursuant to section 13. Pub. L. 88-
467 § 13, 78 Stat. 564, 569 (1964).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
33. Implied rights of actions were first recognized by the federal courts under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 P Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa.
1946), and then approved by the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). A private right of action under section 14(a)
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), was recognized by the Supreme Court in J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964). This recognition of purchasers and sellers of securities and
shareholders as protected federal classes, coupled with the federal class action, gave a powerful impetus
to the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance.
34. In 1984, the SEC obtained the power to name officers, directors, and other corporate officials
as "causes" of false or misleading filings pursuant to section 15(c) of the Exchange Act. See generally
William R. McLucas & Laurie Romanowich, SEC Enforcement Proceedings Under Section 15(c)(4) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAw. 145 (1985). In 1990, the SEC obtained the power to
bar or suspend officers and directors in court cases. Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 101(e), 104 Stat. 931,
933 (1990). In Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC obtained the power to levy such bars administratively Pub.
L. No. 107-204, § 1105(a), 116 Stat. 745, 809 (2002) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3).
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preme Court voiced the view that Congress had not meant to federalize corporate
governance when it passed the federal securities laws) 5 Further, the SEC was
rebuffed in its efforts to impose a voting rights rule on public companies in the
1980s because it lacked authority to interfere with internal corporate affairs.36
Accordingly, although the federal securities laws were based on a shareholder
primacy norm, the SEC was able to affect corporate governance only at the mar-
gins, and the articulation of director fiduciary duties was generally left to state
law
During the merger and acquisition boom of the 1980s, some theorists advo-
cated a shareholder primacy model for corporate boards, urging that directors
remain completely passive when a tender offer for a corporation was made so that
the shareholders could determine the outcome of a control contest without any
interference from directors 7. 3 The states did not accept this formulation. In Dela-
ware, where over half of all public companies are incorporated, the courts devel-
oped the doctrine that when directors perceive that a tender offer is a threat to
the corporation, they may take defensive measures that are reasonable in relation
to the threat posed.3 8 There are two exceptions to this rule. If a company is up
for sale, directors are obligated to obtain the highest price available for the benefit
of shareholders.3 9 In this situation, the interests of shareholders can trump the
interests of the corporation as a whole because the corporation is doomed to
disappear. The second exception to the ability of directors to frustrate a takeover
is that they are prohibited from interfering with shareholder voting rights.4 0 In
some cases involving control contests, a shareholder primacy norm was espoused.
For example, in cases where bondholders were disadvantaged by tender offers,
the courts upheld shareholder interests over the interests of creditors.4 ' As a gen-
eral matter, however, the courts allowed interests of the corporation and its non-
shareholder constituencies to be considered.4 2 Also, most of the states passed
other constituency statutes permitting, or in some cases mandating, that directors
take into account the interests of constituencies other than shareholders in re-
35. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 86 (1987); Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc.,
472 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977).
36. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F2d 406, 413-14 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
37. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L.J. 698 (1982). It is interesting that this is the rule in the United Kingdom, not by reason of company
law, but rather by reason of the Takeover Code, which prohibits "frustrating action" by directors once
a tender offer for their company is initiated. See Simmons & Simmons, The Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers in the City Code, City Code on Takeovers and Mergers General Principle 7, available at http://
www.simmons-simmons.com/display-home/takeover/samples/TakeoverPanel.ppt (last visited Oct. 14,
2004). Thus, the same tension between a duty to the corporation as a whole and a duty to shareholders
that is seen in the United States between state and federal law also can be observed between company
law and securities law in the United Kingdom.
38. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985).
39. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
40. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 662-63 (Del. Ch. 1988).
41. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F Supp. 1504, 1524 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 723 F Supp. 976, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
42. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989).
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sponding to hostile tender offers.4 3 In trying to reconcile the conflicts of interest
involved, the best the courts could do was to stress that:
It is basic to our law that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility
for managing the business and affairs of a corporation. In discharging this
function, the directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the cor-
poration and its shareholders. This unremitting obligation extends equally
to board conduct in a sale of corporate control.
44
In the 1990s, the shareholder primacy norm spawned widespread abuse and
illegal behavior by public corporations, their investment bankers, and their ad-
visors. As expressed by Professor Coffee,
the blunt truth is that recent accounting scandals and the broader phenom-
enon of earnings management are by-products of a system of corporate gov-
ernance that has indeed made corporate managers more accountable to the
market. Yet sensitivity to the market can be a mixed blessing, particularly
when the market becomes euphoric and uncritical.
4 5
The abuses by Enron and its ilk in the corporate world will not be repeated here.
Neither will the abuses by research analysts, underwriters, auditors, and other
gatekeepers. What all of these scandals had in common of relevance to this Article
is the distortion of financial reporting and disclosure. According to a study by the
General Accounting Office, approximately ten percent of publicly traded com-
panies restated their financial statements between 1997 and 2001.46 Blame for
this sorry state of affairs can be assigned to many culprits, but this Article will
argue that institutional investors should be included among the-culprits for two
reasons. First, they did a poor job of analyzing corporate finances and prospects,
or at the very least acquiesced in unrealistic valuations.4 7 Second, in aggressively
pursuing a shareholder primacy norm, they encouraged earnings manipulations
and excessive executive compensation schemes.
Institutional investors account for over half the ownership and seventy-five
percent of the trading in equities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
("NYSE"). 48 Institutions were heavily invested in the high flyers of the 1990s that
collapsed. In the case of Enron, it can be argued that much of what led to the
43. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REv. 579 (1992).
44. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988) (internal citations
omitted).
45. John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89
CORNELL L. REv. 269, 271 (2004).
46. REPORT To THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SEN-
ATE, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET IM-
PACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 15 (2002) (GAO-03-138), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03138.pdf.
47. Coffee, supra note 45, at 274-75.
48. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail
to File Claims in Securities Class Actions? 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 855 n.4 (2002).
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corporation's collapse was discernable from its SEC filings,49 yet at the peak of
the market, sixty percent of Enron stock was held by large institutional investors.
5 0
The assets of institutional investors generally are managed by outside fund man-
agers who are primarily motivated to perform better than other managers on a
quarterly basis. This pressure leads to herd behavior."1 It also leads to a trading
mentality that is at odds with the model of shareholders as owners.52
The idea that managerial and director interests should be aligned with share-
holder interests, an idea fostered by institutional investors, led to the popularity
of stock options as a form of executive compensation and a shocking deterioration
of controls with regard to executive compensation. Because executive compen-
sation needs to be defended only as reasonable rather than fair to the corpora-
tion,5 3 it is generally established by reference to marketplace standards.5 4 Because
the bull market gave such exaggerated values to stock options and other equity
compensation, the market for executive compensation was completely distorted.
It has been argued that shareholders did not adequately constrain executive com-
pensation that was set by managers with little outside control.5 5 Indeed, it can be
argued that institutional investors assisted in raising executive compensation to
historically high levels.56 State courts generally declined to interfere with exorbi-
tant compensation schemes until after the bursting of the stock market bubble
and the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley 57 Congress and the SEC only exacerbated
the situation. Congress prevented the Financial Accounting Standards Board from
insisting that stock options be expensed .5 The SEC rolled back a rule that had
required shareholders to approve stock option plans. 59
49. See William W Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275,
1299-1332 (2002); Anthony H. Catanach, Jr. & Shelley Rhoades-Catanach, Enron: A Financial Re-
porting Failure?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1057, 1074-76 (2003) (noting pre-existing accounting problems at
Enron were largely ignored by the financial community).
50. Paul M. Healy & Krishna Palepu, Governance and Intermediation Problems in Capital Markets:
Evidence from the Fall of Enron, Harvard NOM Research Paper No. 02-27, 22 (Aug. 2002). Further,
Calpers and some other pension funds were invested in Enron's special purpose entities. See Richard
A. Oppel, Jr., Employees' Retirement Plan is a Victim as Enron Tumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at Al.
51. Healy & Palepu, supra note 50, at 26-27. See, e.g., David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein,
Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465-66 (1990).
52. See CONFERENCE BOARD COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 33-34.
53. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 337 (Del. Ch. 1997); Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 359
(Del. Ch. 1983).
54. See Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F Supp. 1129, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Hall v. John S. Isaacs &
Sons Farms, Inc., 146 A.2d 602, 610-12 (Del. Ch. 1958), aff'd in part, 163 A.2d 288 (Del. 1960).
See generally Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts? 8J. CORP.
L. 231, 270 (1983).
55. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002).
56. Coffee, supra note 45, at 274-75. See, e.g., Amy L. Goodman, The Fuss Over Executive Com-
pensation, INSIGHTS, Jan. 1992, at 2.
57. See and compare In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998), rev'd
sub nom, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000), remanded to In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). Whether the Delaware courts will become more proactive in
controlling excessive executive compensation remains to be seen.
58. See Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax Ac-
counting Conformity Defense, COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 35, 98 (2003).
59. Prior to 1996, corporations were required to obtain shareholder approval for executive stock
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Equity-based compensation focused directors and managements on stock mar-
ket prices instead of other traditional metrics used in bonus plans. Pressures by
institutional investors for ever higher quarterly earnings made matters worse. The
temptation to manage earnings became too great for many corporations, and
issuers were not reined in by their auditors, their investment bankers, or other
advisors. Investors and financial intermediaries were enthralled by equity and
equity was king. Traditional valuations for stocks were discarded as technologi-
cally obsolescent.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed to restore investor confidence after the collapse
of the stock market in 2000-01, is based on a shareholder primacy model and
envisions a board of directors independent from management and accountable
instead to stockholders. The statute gives the SEC new powers to regulate cor-
porate governance that could be used to replace the balancing permitted directors
of shareholders and other constituents under state law. Audit committees and
other committees are set up as potential adversaries of management. 60 Prior in-
direct regulation of CEOs and CFOs is replaced by some direct regulation. 6' Ex-
ecutive compensation is subject to some SEC regulation. 62 The SEC's regulation
of auditors is greatly strengthened and, by making auditors accountable to audit
committees, the power of management to influence accountants is limited. In the
case of corporate counsel, the power of management is also diminished. Whether
this weakening of the authority of the CEO will turn out to be a development for
good or ill is not the subject of this Article. What is significant is that areas of the
law that previously were handled by the states are now matters of federal regu-
lation for the benefit of investors and not other constituents. Further, the insti-
tutional investors that bear some responsibility for the problems that led to the
adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley became subject to no new regulation. Rather, they
are the beneficiaries of this legislation. The extent to which this turn of events
has emboldened institutional investors can be shown by the controversy over
shareholder nominations.
III. SHAREHOLDER NOMINATIONS
Institutional investors include government pension funds, labor unions, cor-
porate pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and bank trust de-
partments. In 1998, institutions held more than sixty percent of the voting shares
of major U.S. corporations, due in great part to the growth of pension funds for
option plans in order to exempt the exercise of such options and the subsequent sale of shares from
short-swing profit restrictions of section 16(b) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000). In
1996, the SEC promulgated Rule 16b-3 under the Exchange Act, 17 C.ER. § 240.16b-3, eliminating
the necessity of a shareholder approval for the purposes of section 16(b) exemption. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 37,260, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,376, 30,377-78 (June 14, 1996). Delaware and
New York were quick to follow by amending their laws so as to obviate the need for such a vote. See
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(b)-(c) (2003); N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 505(d) (2003).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002).
61. Id. §§ 7241, 78u-3.
62. Id. §§ 7243, 7244, 78m, 78u-3.
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employees and retirees of major corporations and governmental units.63 At the
end of the third quarter of 2002, U.S. institutions held 49.8 percent of all U.S.
equities, with pension funds holding 21.5 percent.64 The percentage of institu-
tional participation in stock market activity has also increased. Large block trans-
actions (10,000 or more shares) are a gauge of institutional trading. In 1978,
block trades represented 22.9 percent of reported volume on the NYSE. 65 By 1988,
large block transactions represented 51.1 percent of NYSE volume.66 By 2003, the
percentage of large block transactions fell to thirty-seven percent, most likely as
a result of the influx of retail investors during the late 1990s bull market and
changing trading strategies of institutional investors. 67
Pension funds control the largest block of U.S. institutional assets, although
their percentage share of total assets has been giving way to mutual funds. In
1998, pension funds held forty-eight percent of all equity assets held by institu-
tions.6 Because public pension funds devote an increasing amount of their assets
to equities, they are the most activist on corporate governance matters and have
increasing clout.69 This activism has been expressed through increased pressure
on management for corporate governance reforms and lobbying for federal and
state legislation and rulemaking. 70 In the wake of the financial scandals that ex-
ploded with Enron, some politically motivated institutions with very large hold-
ings, in particular state comptrollers and treasurers managing government pension
funds, campaigned for shareholder nominations to be included on management's
proxy statement.7' The SEC responded by proposing such a rule.72
There is nothing to prevent any shareholder from nominating a director in
opposition to a director nominated by a current board, but this can be a costly
endeavor.7 3 Shareholders who desire to use management's proxy want a cheaper
way to put forward candidates in opposition to candidates selected by a corpo-
ration's current board. A group of state pension fund managers from New York,
California, and elsewhere, as self-declared "representatives of shareholders," ad-
vocated broad shareholder access to the company's proxy card on the ground that
63. Warren F Grienenberger, Institutional Investor and Corporate Governance 25, 27 (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B0-006E, 1999), available at WL 1093 PLI/Corp 25.
64. See NYSE Data, Fact Book: Interactive Viewer, at http://www.nysedata.com/factbook/viewer_
edition.asp?mode = table&key = 2673&category = 12 (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
65. See id. at http://www.nysedata.com/factbook/viewer edition.asp?mode = table&key = 1203
&category = 3 (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
66. See id. at http://www.nysedata.com/factbook/viewer-edition.asp?mode= table&key=802
&category= 3 (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
67. See id. at http://www.nysedata.conlfactbook/viewer-edition.asp?mode=table&key=240
&category= 3 (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
68. Symposium, The Institutional Investor's Goals for Corporate Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25
DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 38 (2000).
69. Id. at 38-39.
70. Grienenberger, supra note 63, at 28-29.
71. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784,
60,786 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.ER. pts. 240, 249, 274).
72. Id. at 60,787. At the time of this writing, a final rule had not been passed. It is possible it will
differ in minor respects or substantially from the proposed rule.
73. CONFERENCE BOARD COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 24-25.
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"[c] ompetition for board seats and the accountability that contested elections im-
pose will raise standards for those who serve as directors.'74 The American Fed-
eration of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations urged shareholder nom-
inations as "necessary to restore genuine accountability to a boardroom culture
that for too long has been characterized by cozy relationships and a resulting
unwillingness to challenge management.17 5 By contrast, the Business Roundtable
attacked the SEC proposals as "sweeping, harmful changes in corporate gover-
nance practices" which would give undue leverage to special interest groups and
generate expense for corporations "to ensure that each of their directors' primary
loyalty is to the company and all shareholders."76 The politically charged atmo-
sphere in which the SEC's proposals were floated may obscure the complicated
and difficult issues raised by the pending regulation and the elevation of the
shareholder primacy norm in director elections.
The SEC's proposed rule would create a mechanism whereby director nominees
of long-term security holders, or groups of long-term security holders, with sig-
nificant holdings, could be included in company proxy materials where there are
indications that the proxy process has been ineffective or that security holders are
dissatisfied with that process.77 The proposal would be applicable to all companies
subject to the proxy rules and once applicable, shareholder access would apply
for two years. 78 The names of shareholder nominees proposed through this mech-
anism may be submitted by a shareholder or group who has beneficially owned
at least 5 percent of shares outstanding for at least two years who express their
intent to hold the shares through the annual meeting.79 Any shareholder or group
nominating a candidate must be eligible to report beneficial ownership on Ex-
change Act Schedule 13G and have filed such a schedule. 80 The candidacy or
election of board nominees must not violate controlling state law, federal law, or
the rules of any applicable national securities exchange or association.8' Further,
the nominee must satisfy the objective independence criteria of the listing standard
74. Letter from Alan G. Hevesi, Comptroller, State of New York, to William Donaldson, Chairman,
SEC (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.osc.state.nyus/press/releases/octO3/proxyletter.pdf. Seealso
Alison Carpenter, AFSCME, CalPERS Seek Investor Access to Nomination Process, 35 Sec. Reg- & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1599 (Sept. 29, 2003).
75. AFL/CIO Comment Letter, supra note 3.
76. Letter from Henry A. McKinnell, Chairman, Business Roundtable, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secre-
tary, SEC (Dec. 22, 2003) (emphasis in original), available at http://www-sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s71903/brt122203.htm.
77. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,784.
78. Two circumstances would trigger shareholder access: the receipt of more than 35 percent "with-
hold" votes of any director; or a shareholder proposal to activate the shareholder access process
proposed by a shareholder or group who have held at least one percent of outstanding shares for one
year and received a majority of shareholder votes cast. Id. at 60,789-90. The maximum number of
nominees that may be proposed is as follows: one nominee if the board has eight or fewer directors;
two nominees if the board has between nine and nineteen directors; three nominees if the board has
twenty or more directors. Id. at 60,797. If a company receives nominees in excess of the applicable
numbers, those nominees from a shareholder or group with the largest share ownership would be
selected as nominees. Id. at 60,798.
79. Id. at 60,794.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 60,795.
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applicable to the issuer and have no specified relationships with the nominating
shareholder or group or agreements with the issuer regarding the nomination.82
For some time, companies have been required to disclose in their proxy state-
ments whether they have a standing nominating committee, and if so, to describe
its members, functions and processes, including whether the committee considers
shareholder recommendations for board nominees.8 3 Under the SEC's new dis-
closure rules,8 4 beginning January 1, 2004, companies are required to provide
further information about a board's processes for director selection, its consid-
eration of candidates recommended by shareholders, and the procedure by which
shareholders may submit candidates for consideration to the board. 85 If a company
does not have a nominating committee, it must state why it does not.8 6 If a
company does have a nominating committee, it will have to make the charter of
the nominating committee available on its website or as an attachment to its proxy
statement at least once every three years."7 Information regarding the indepen-
dence of nominating committee members must be set forth.88 Among other new
required disclosures are statements as to whether the nominating committee has
a. policy regarding shareholder nominees and, if the nominating committee has
received a nomination from a shareholder or a group of shareholders who ben-
eficially owns more than five percent of the company's voting common shares, a
statement as to whether the nominating committee chose to nominate such a
candidate.8 9 Further, issuers must describe any minimum director qualifications
sought by its nominating committee, the process by which its nominating com-
mittee identifies and evaluates nominees, and the source for the recommendation
of any nominees, such as a security holder, a non-management director, an ex-
ecutive officer, or a third party search firm.90
The SEC's rule proposal on shareholder nominations goes beyond disclosure
and has been very controversial because it raises a variety of legal and policy
82. The SEC's shareholder access proposals were preceded by the publication of a staff report on
shareholder access to proxies, Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination
and Election of Directors, 12003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,938, at 87,869 (July
15, 2003) and new disclosure requirements with regard to board nominating committees. Disclosure
Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications between Security Holders and
Boards of Directors, Exchange Act Release 48,301, 68 Fed. Reg. 48,724, 48,724 (proposed Aug. 14,
2003) (to be codified at 17 C.ER. pt. 240); Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions
and Communications Between Security Holders and Boards of Directors; Republication, Exchange Act
Release 48,825, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,204 (Nov. 28, 2003) (republication Dec. 11, 2003) (to be codified
at 17 C.ER. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, and 274).
83. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between Secu-
rity Holders and Boards of Directors, 68 Fed. Reg. at 48,725.
84. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between Secu-
rity Holders and Boards of Directors, Republication, 68 Fed. Reg. at 69,204.
85. Id. at 69,205.
86. Id. at 69,205-06.
87. Id. at 69,206.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 69,207.
90. Id. at 69,206-07.
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questions, most of which are beyond the scope of this Article.91 The policy ques-
tion of relevance here is whether activist institutional shareholders should be
permitted access to management's proxy when these shareholders do not repre-
sent anyone but themselves and do not have any duties to either the corporation
or other shareholders. Underlying all of the rhetoric in the letters of comment on
the SEC proposal is a serious policy issue of the legitimacy of certain institutional
shareholders to initiate changes in the board of directors or corporate governance.
Why should a corporation be managed for the benefit of some institutional in-
vestors rather than all of its shareholders?
Some commenters have recognized this issue, if only indirectly There was
considerable debate on the length of time a shareholder should own stock in a
corporation before being eligible for making a shareholder nomination. 92 In ad-
dition, there was a suggestion that a nominating shareholder should be required
to represent its intent to hold the securities not only until the date of the election
of directors, but thereafter for the duration of the nominee's term as a director if
the nominee is elected. 93 Further, the shareholder should continue to hold the
requisite stake in the corporation necessary to initiate a shareholder proposal.
94
One of the proponents of the rule acknowledged the costs and risks to public
companies, and their shareholders, including the risk that nominees might seek
to represent a limited group of shareholders and suggested that any security
holder's nominee be required to certify that, if elected, the nominee would rep-
resent the financial interests of all security holders.95
The state treasurers, comptrollers, and labor unions that have been the prime
movers in urging the SEC forward in the direction of shareholder proxy access
declared that shareholders are owners of corporations and should have the right
to nominate candidates for directors on the company proxy card.96 In an insti-
91. Among other things, the proposal raises some serious questions concerning the SEC's authority
to adopt such a rule. See and contrast, Business Roundtable, Detailed Comments of Business Roundtable
on The "Proposed Election Contest Rules" of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, at 1-19, available
at httpJ//www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/brt122203.pdf [hereinafter Business Roundtable]; Letter
from the Faculty of Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
SEC (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/harvard120303.htm. See
also Letter from Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
SEC (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7l9O3/aba010704.htm. There
also has been debate about whether a rule permitting shareholder access to management's proxies
would be unduly disruptive of normal board functioning. Id. at 5-6; Letter from Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s71903/wachtell11 1403.htm [hereinafter Wachtell Letter]; Letter from James P Hoffa,
General President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec.
22, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7l9O3/s71903-487.pdf (hereinafter Hoffa
Letter].
92. See Business Roundtable, supra note 91; see Wachtell Letter, supra note 91; Letter from Peter
C. Clapman, Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel, Corporate Governance, Teachers Insurance and
Annuity Association of America-College Retirement and Equities Fund, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
SEC (Dec. 17, 2003), at httpI/wwwsec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/pclapmanl 2l 7O3.htm [hereinafter
Clapman Letter].
93. Wachtell Letter, supra note 91, at 6.
94. Business Roundtable, supra note 91, at 63.
95. See Clapman Letter, supra note 92, at 3.
96. Hoffa Letter, supra note 91, at 2.
14 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 60, November 2004
tutional stock market, where pension funds are not investing their own money
but the savings of pension fund beneficiaries and where the heads of such pension
funds generally delegate investment decision-making to a wide variety of pension
fund managers, some of whom are long-term investors but some of whom are
short-term traders and many of whom choose indexation as an investment strat-
egy, it is really a legal fiction (however useful) to say that shareholders are owners
of a company Although an investor in a passive index is not indifferent to how
the companies in that index fund perform, the institution is not analyzing any of
the available information concerning the company prior to making an investment
and is not allocating capital in the economy to its best and most efficient use. A
short-term trader may have even less interest in company fundamentals.
Contested elections are being advocated by government pension funds and
others who may be overly influenced by governmental rather than business mod-
els. The notion that corporate suffrage should mimic political suffrage so that
there should be contested elections for directors is flawed because corporations
are managed for economic gain, not democratic objectives. Although it has been
asserted that printing and mailing proxy material is prohibitively expensive, and
therefore substantial, long-term shareholders should "have a means to assure that
the corporation is being directed and managed [o]n their behalf,"97 a large share-
holder or group is not necessarily more representative of the interests of the
shareholders as a body than management and the board, who have fiduciary
duties to all of the shareholders. By contrast, one shareholder or minority group
does not have fiduciary duties to other shareholders.
Demands by institutional directors for greater power with respect to corporate
governance are unlikely to subside whatever the SEC decides with respect to
shareholder nominations. Institutional investor power is being exercised in vari-
ous shareholder proposals and in other ways.98 Probably the most effective lever
institutions have is their ability to drive down the price of a company's stock by
refusing to invest or selling shares. The SEC's shareholder nomination proposal
has touched off such a furor because it involves a power struggle over corporate
control. Traditional corporation law teaches that shareholders who have a con-
trolling interest in a corporation have fiduciary duties to other shareholders.
IV CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS
In the 1930s, the accepted theory of the firm was a managerialist theory, al-
though there was not agreement as to the proper object of a corporation's efforts.
In the famous debate between Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd, both assumed
that corporate managers exercised free reign.99 Dodd argued that the state should
97. CONFERENCE BOARD COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 25.
98. See Institutional Shareholder Services, Institutional Shareholder Services Releases Preliminary
Proxy Season Review (June 16, 2004), available at http://www.issproxycomlpdf/2004_Season-Wrap-
Up_061604.pdf.; Chip Cummins, Pension Funds Sue Shell Officials To Force Revamp, WALL ST. J., June
28, 2004, at A3.
99. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers
Practicable?, 2 U. CHI L. REV. 194, 196-98 (1935).
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regulate this absolute control of corporate property exercised by corporate man-
agers not only for the benefit of shareholders, but also for society at large.lo ° He
viewed corporations as autocratic merchant states that derived their power from
the government and therefore had to be brought under government control for
the benefit of society at large.'10 Berle, on the other hand, viewed corporate officers
as representatives and was concerned about making corporate managers more
responsive to the economic interest of shareholders.' 0 2 He hypothesized that
shareholders had surrendered control of the corporation to management and that
such control needed to be returned to shareholders through the enforcement of
fiduciary duties owed to them by officers and directors. 0 3 The managerialist the-
ory was thus an interesting transition from the view that corporation law was
constitutional law because the powers of the corporation came from the state
(sometimes called the concession theory) 0 4 to the view that corporate power
derived from shareholders.
The debate between Professors Berle and Dodd in 1931 and 1932 formed part
of the backdrop for New Deal reform legislation. The federal securities laws
adopted the Berle view and compelled managers who tapped the capital markets
to behave like public functionaries and be accountable to investors through the
mechanism of full disclosure. 0 5 But the creation of the SEC as a surrogate for
investors was really the beginning of a trend toward a theory of the firm based
on shareholder primacy Although merit regulation was rejected, and corporations
were not obligated to demonstrate viable capital structures in order to go public,
some control of capital structures was maintained through state blue sky laws and
then rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") appli-
cable to underwriters. 0 6 Today, shareholder primacy is the dominant theory of
the firm, although it has some competitors. 0 7 As a theory of the firm, shareholder
primacy rests on two principles-shareholder wealth maximization as the object
of corporate endeavor, and the principle of ultimate shareholder control. 08
Although the SEC has always viewed itself as the surrogate for shareholders
and investors, regulating and disciplining corporate managers for their sake, a
very different theory of the firm-the contractarian or corporation as a nexus of
100. Id. at 205-07.
101. Id. at 198; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1161-63 (1932).
102. A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1365,
1365 (1932).
103. See id. at 1367, 1371; A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1049, 1049-50 (1931).
104. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Enron's Tangled Web: Complex Relationships; Unanswered Ques-
tions, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1167, 1170-71 (2003). Under this theory, directors are viewed as agents of
the state.
105. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
106. See NASD Conduct Rule 2110, Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers Manual (CCH) 4111 (2004).
107. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 440-41,447-49 (2001).
108. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 573.
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contracts-became quite popular in the early 1990s.10 9 Pursuant to this theory,
corporate power and managerial authority came from the private sector by way
of consensual agreements between various corporate constituents."" The propo-
nents of this theory believed that the law should facilitate private ordering and
government regulators should take a back seat to market forces."'
A different political twist was given to the notion that constituents other than
shareholders might have some claim on managerial allegiance by the team pro-
duction theory The team production theory recognizes that corporate production
requires inputs from a number of different groups including creditors, employees,
and managers, in addition to shareholders."' These groups participate in and
contribute to corporate success because they expect to be compensated in accor-
dance with their explicit contracts.' 3 The team production theory logically fol-
lowed from the enactment of other constituency statutes that undermined share-
holder primacy in takeovers and in some cases more generally " 4 The team
production theory harkens back to the ideas of Dodd to some extent, because it
stresses corporate obligations to non-shareholder constituencies and is hostile to
shareholder primacy One of its proponents has argued that there are three jus-
tifications for shareholder primacy and two of them-that shareholders own the
corporation, and that shareholders are the sole residual claimants of the corpo-
ration-are incorrect from both an economic and legal perspective.' '5 In her view,
the best justification for shareholder primacy is that requiring corporate directors
to serve only shareholders is the best way to keep them from imposing excessive
agency costs on firms, but this justification is weak.1 6
A new theory of the firm that has been proposed is director primacy Under
this theory, the power and right to exercise decision-making is vested in the board
109. See William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1395, 1400 (1993); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416, 1426-28 (1989). The theory of the corporation as a nexus of contractual relationships
was introduced in the 1970s by economists. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/paper.taf?ABSTRACTID = 94043 (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
110. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1416,
1426-28 (1989).
111. Id. at 1434-35.
112. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L REv.
247, 250 (1999).
113. See generally id.
114. As of 1999, forty-one states had enacted some form of other constituency statute. Delaware,
the state of incorporation for the majority of U.S. public companies, had not. See RyanJ. York, Visages
of Janus: The Heavy Burden of Other Constituency Anti-Taheover Statutes on Shareholders and the Efficient
Market for Corporate Control, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 187, 189-90 (2002). See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
202(b)(5) (2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65
(West 1992 & Supp. 2004); NEV. REV. STATE. ANN. § 78.138(4) (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2003); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717(b) (McKinney 2003); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson 1999); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (West 1999); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1992).
115. Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189,
1190-95 (2002).
116. Id. at 1199-1201.
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of directors.1 17 The board is viewed as sovereign." 8 This theory is an interesting
update of the managerialist theory of the firm. The board is recognized as the
fulcrum of the firm, mediating between managers and shareholders, as well as
other constituencies, but with fiat authority to make decisions." 9 This theory
would appear to accommodate the increasing emphasis on the importance of
independent directors, and although harkening back to managerialism, argues
that managers and directors are separate centers of power. Further, shareholder
rights to control the firm are "so weak that they scarcely qualify as part of corporate
governance." 20
To what extent are any of these academic theories accepted by practicing law-
yers, judges or business leaders? The American Law Institute's Corporate Gov-
ernance Project' 2' is based on a shareholder primacy model, in which corporations
are run for shareholder gain and an independent board of directors, representing
the shareholders, monitors corporate management.122 The Delaware courts have
given managers and directors considerable freedom to thwart shareholders in
takeover situations, 2 3 but have insisted on the importance of shareholder suffrage
and held in check managers and directors who have attempted to interfere with
shareholder voting rights. 124 One group of business and political leaders recently
described the compact that underlies corporate capitalism as one in which "in-
vestors entrust their assets to management while boards of directors oversee man-
agement so that the potential for conflict of interest between owners and managers
is policed." 2 5
In truth, managerialism probably is more consonant with the realities of the
business world than any of the more recent academic theories about the firm.
The modem public corporation is a vast bureaucratic organization of great com-
plexity Although shareholders have the power to vote for directors and, in theory,
the directors appoint the managers; both shareholders and directors are part-time
participants in the corporation's affairs. The corporate scandals of recent years
have demonstrated that corporate managers, and in particular, CEOs, have great
power and insufficient accountability Without such power, they probably could
not manage the modem corporation, which is based on a hierarchical structure.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is an effort to set up independent directors as a check
upon corporate managers. Whether this model will work remains to be seen
because boards of directors have long operated by consensus. The shareholder
nomination rule proposal is an effort to encourage institutional investors to make
117. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 559-60.
118. Id. at 569.
119. Id. at 559-60.
120. Id. at 569.
121. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994).
122. See id. §§ 2.01, 3.01, 3.02.
123. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152-54 (Del. 1989);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958-59 (Del. 1985).
124. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus., Inc. v.
Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 658-63 (Del. Ch. 1988).
125. CONFERENCE BOARD COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 5.
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managers more accountable. The SEC's statutory mandate is to protect investors,
and the accountability the SEC is seeking is accountability to shareholders, not
some larger public or other constituencies. The problem with giving investors
greater power to hold managers accountable, however, is that investors are part
of the problem.
V. THE TROUBLE WITH INVESTORS
The Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise ex-
pressed the view that:
a strong focus on the corporation's long-term economic growth and viability
is essential to the restoration of trust in public corporations. This focus in-
volves not only the board's and management's long-term strategies and con-
duct of the business to create lasting value, but also the development of a
base of shareowners whose investment is similarly for long-term growth and
gain .... Such a long-term ownership focus provides an impetus to avoid
management focused exclusively on short-term gain. The Commission be-
lieves that managing for short-term earnings and stock price results has led
to many of the behaviors and manipulations that have resulted in the recent
corporate crises and loss of investor confidence.1
2 6
Institutional investors, like other investors, are interested in overall return. Most
institutions hire pension fund managers to invest their portfolios and they are
judged according to fairly short time frames. In their competition with one an-
other, they seek quarter-to-quarter and year-to-year performance statistics that are
better than those of their peers. One of the recommendations of the Conference
Board Commission is that "[i]nstitutional investors should establish compensation
arrangements for portfolio managers that reward a long-term rather than short-
term focus."127 The proclivity of institutions to focus on short-term gain for money
managers has been demonstrated by the recent mutual fund scandals. 2
During the 1980s, the pressure for high overall return by institutional investors
in U.S. corporations resulted in an unhealthy leveraging of U.S. corporations to
meet that demand. Funds were borrowed to pay dividends to shareholders, in
the form of ordinary cash distributions, share repurchases, or takeover premiums.
The net effect was the opposite of capital formation: it was a liquidation of in-
dustry. Furthermore, the transaction costs from this restructuring were huge and
siphoned money from industry into investment banking and legal fees.' 29
126. Id. at 17.
127. Id. at 34.
128. See John Hechinger, Putnam Says It Will Replace Fund Managers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2003,
at Cl; Tom Launcella, Mutual-Fund Scandal Clouds Bottom Lines; 'Dilution' Costs to Shareholders Could
Be Large and the Target of Regulators' Recovery Efforts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2003, at C1.
129. See BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE 108, 187,208,220-21,243,
254, 298-99, 317, 336-37, 390, 510 (1990); PAUL R. KRUGMAN, THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECTA-
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In the 1990s, institutions pressured managers and directors to become aligned
with stockholders that led to an excessive use of stock options and other equity-
based incentives. This encouraged managers to focus on stock market prices in-
stead of other measures of corporate performance. As long as the bull market
raged on, everyone was happy, but when the market collapsed, the public's dis-
tress led to anger and distrust. The blame for fraudulent financial statements at
Enron and many other corporations has been laid upon greedy corporate man-
agers and supine directors. New securities regulation was mandated by Sarbanes-
Oxley and the SEC and other prosecutions were undertaken to restore investor
confidence; however, the truly difficult questions with respect to the savings and
pension losses suffered by Americans were not being asked. That is, why were
the holdings of so many institutions and individuals invested in equities rather
than in bonds? 30 And why did investors permit corporate capital structures to
become leveraged to such an unhealthy extent?
When the federal securities laws were first enacted, many policy makers be-
lieved that full disclosure was not a sufficient federal remedy for the excesses of
the 1920s. William 0. Douglas argued that industry needed "constructive plan-
ning and organization conditioned by the requirements of the public good ....
That in essence means control over access to the market.' 3' The United States
never embraced this kind of central planning, and given the failures of commu-
nism and socialism in other countries, that was probably fortunate. The United
States long had faith in the ability of the market to efficiently allocate capital. This
meant that investors were expected to analyze the disclosures mandated by the
SEC and direct capital to the corporations able to use that capital. Of the many
social contracts that were broken in the 1990s, this expectation that investors,
and particularly institutional investors, with the money and professionalism to
choose good investments, would do so for the benefit of the national economy,
failed. The inability or unwillingness of investors to assess relative corporate values
and invest their capital efficiently and wisely should give pause to the notion
that greater shareholder power is the solution to the problems of the financial
markets. Why should shareholders obtain more rights unless they assume greater
obligations?
The activist institutional investors have large holdings in corporate equities and
are politically influential. There is some evidence, however, that other investors,
including other institutional investors, "are not particularly interested in corporate
governance issues."' 32 If institutional investors do not solicit their own benefici-
aries as to their views, and they certainly do not solicit the views of other investors
or owe them any duties, it seems inappropriate for them to obtain rights that are
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not accorded to investors generally If such rights are accompanied by greater
obligations, new difficulties could emerge.
Imposing obligations to a business enterprise or other shareholders upon in-
stitutional investors would be a tricky business. Such a duty could include a duty
to monitor the soundness and fairness of a corporation's capital structure, but in
some situations such a duty could involve a conflict of interest. First and foremost,
institutional investors should be concerned about their duties to their own ben-
eficiaries, and if these duties were to come into conflict with a duty to the cor-
poration in which the institution is a shareholder, it is not clear how such a conflict
could be resolved.
Although the obligation of institutional investors to invest prudently and then
monitor their investments can best be enforced by those who regulate such in-
stitutions for the benefit of protected groups, such regulators vary in their con-
cerns and regulatory mandates. Banking regulators are concerned about safety
and soundness for the benefit of depositors and insurance regulators are con-
cerned about safeguarding the interests of policyholders.133 The SEC is concerned
about mutual fund shareholders and conflicts of interest between funds and their
advisors. 134 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and the Department of
Labor are concerned about the solvency of corporate-defined benefit pension
funds in order to safeguard the interests of retirees. 135
Although none of these regulators have responsibility for the efficient allocation
of assets in the national economy, and perhaps such regulation would not be
welcomed in a capitalist system, more rigorous enforcement of prudent investor-
type principles might have the side benefit of making institutions invest more
wisely In addition, mechanisms to encourage institutional investors to hold se-
curities for the long term might be considered by policy makers. This might
particularly be applicable to pension funds and endowment funds that should, in
theory, be looking at the long term.
The problems of speculative and short-term trading by institutional investors
is not new, but the possible creation of a federal right to nominate directors on
management's proxy and thus change existing state law does raise some new
issues. If institutions win the right to make shareholder nominations, what duties
should they then have to other shareholders? Majority shareholders have duties
to exercise due care and deal fairly with minority shareholders because they con-
trol the board of directors. If favored institutions begin to nominate and cause
the election of directors in opposition to the selection by an existing board, such
133. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Secrets of Bank Regulation: A Reply to Professor Cohen, 6
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institutions should, in appropriate cases, be held to the same kind of duties that
are imposed on controlling shareholders. They should undertake to monitor the
directors they propose and remain shareholders for the duration of the terms of
office of such directors. They should monitor corporate capital structures to pre-
vent unfair recapitalizations. Further, they should be prevented from using any
power to nominate directors in conflict of interest situations. In the case of labor
union pension funds, this could be treacherous ground because they may be more
interested in labor issues than shareholder issues.
The serious abuses of trust by some corporate managers and directors during
the late 1990s and into the next century have led to a clamor for reform that
seems to now have its own momentum. But perhaps those activist institutions
that are demanding greater rights as shareholders should be more cautious. If
they obtain some of their wishes, they may find that with new rights come new
responsibilities and liabilities.

